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RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICER DOCTRINE: 
WHEN IS FALLING DOWN ON THE JOB A CRIME? 
KATHLEEN M. BOOZANG* 
PROLOGUE 
A federal inspection of a company whose tainted pain medicine has caused 
one of the worst public health drug disasters since the 1930s found greenish-
yellow residue on sterilization equipment, surfaces coated with levels of mold 
and bacteria that exceeded the company’s own environmental limits, and an 
air-conditioner that was shut off nightly despite the importance of controlling 
temperature and humidity. The findings, made public on Friday by the Food 
and Drug Administration, followed a report from Massachusetts regulators on 
Tuesday and offered disturbing new details in an emerging portrait of what 
went wrong inside the New England Compounding Center, the pharmacy at 
the heart of a national meningitis outbreak in which 25 people have died, 
313 more have fallen ill and as many as 14,000 people are believed to 
have been exposed. 
Instead of producing tailor-made drugs for individual patients, as the law 
allowed, the company turned into a major drug maker that supplied some of 
the most prestigious hospitals in the country, including ones affiliated with 
Harvard, Yale and the Mayo Clinic, all with minimal oversight from federal 
regulators. 
Federal officials also drew attention to the company’s proximity to a recycling 
plant where excavators and freight trucks heaped old mattresses, plastics 
and other materials, generating large amounts of dust. The plant, which is 
owned by one of the same people as the pharmacy, has not always 
complied with regulations and has drawn complaints, according to records in 
Framingham, Massachusetts, where the company is located. 
 
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law, Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy. My 
colleagues Charles Sullivan and, in particular, Stephen Lubben and Jordan Paradise, were 
very helpful in their comments, but errors remain mine. I also benefited from the perspective of 
an industry executive, although we ultimately and respectfully disagree. Journal Editors 
Katherine Ledden and Jessica Bailey were nothing short of superb. Seton Hall Center for 
Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy receives funding from a variety of entities, including life 
sciences companies.  Professor Boozang does not personally benefit from such funding. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
78 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 6:77 
And as the death toll continues to rise, the F.D.A.’s commissioner, Dr. 
Margaret Hamburg, who was appointed by President Obama, has stayed 
mostly silent. 
Some observers said that weighing in loudly and publicly on a contentious 
issue was simply not Dr. Hamburg’s style. Others said that it was because 
the agency was preparing a criminal case and would not want to endanger 
that with statements construed to be prejudicial. David Kessler, a former 
F.D.A. commissioner, pointed to the impending presidential election and 
efforts to keep the outbreak from becoming a political issue. 
“Everyone is closed down right now,” he said. “People are being very 
careful. No one wants to make a mistake.” 
The inspection report offered the clearest indication yet that the fungus that 
contaminated the company’s vials of methylprednisolone acetate, an 
injectable pain medicine, may have gotten there because of the company’s 
own practices. 
Inspectors said that 83 out of 321 vials from one of the lots linked to the 
meningitis outbreak that they observed contained “greenish black foreign 
matter” and another 17 vials had “white filamentous material.” 
The report said the company had tested only one sample from that lot, and it 
had proved sterile. When the F.D.A. tested 50 vials from that same lot, all of 
them contained some microbial growth. 
Experts said that perhaps the most worrisome finding was that the company’s 
own testing between January and September found surfaces in the clean 
rooms contaminated with either bacteria or mold exceeding the levels at 
which the company’s own procedures called for remedial measures. In some 
cases, there were so many bacteria or fungi in a sample that the whole 
testing dish was overrun with a so-called overgrowth. 
“Think of a plant just growing out of control,” said Steven Lynn, director of 
the Office of Manufacturing and Product Quality at the F.D.A. Yet, according 
to the agency, there was no evidence the company took remedial actions. 
“This is pretty heinous stuff,” said Lou Diorio of LDT Health Solutions, a 
consultant to compounding pharmacies. “This just shows a general lack of 
basic clean-room principles.”1 
People continue to fall ill and die across nineteen states from the 
contaminated products of the New England Compounding Company 
(NECC). NECC escaped punishment for repeated regulatory gaps since its 
opening in 1999, by a husband and wife who teamed up with a brother-in-
 
 1. Sabrina Tavernise & Andrew Pollack, F.D.A. Details Contamination at Pharmacy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 26, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/27/health/fda-finds-unsanitary-con 
ditions-at-new-england-compounding-center.html?pagewanted=all. 
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law to grow a business whose products, until October 2012, were 
distributed in all fifty states.2 Lawsuits have already been filed.3 Bankruptcy is 
predicted.4 All NECC products shipped in 2012 have been “voluntarily” 
recalled.5 An FDA inspection revealed numerous conditions6 that are likely 
violations of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.7 The State Board of 
Pharmacy has voted to revoke the licenses of the NECC, its pharmacists, 
and NECC’s husband-wife owners.8 
These outcomes are predictable, and the minimum one would expect. 
The pressing question is whether the owners and/or managers should bear 
any criminal responsibility, and whether such criminal liability is possible if 
the government is unable to establish criminal intent or precise knowledge 
of the conditions of the laboratories by the owners and top executives. 
Under a recently resurrected and highly controversial doctrine called the 
Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, the answer to both questions is yes. 
This Article explains the RCO Doctrine, and defends its use in egregious 
cases such as what apparently has transpired in the NECC case. 
 
 2. Toni Clarke & Tim McLaughlin, New England Compounding Center, Pharmacy Tied 
to Meningitis Outbreak, Avoided Sanctions Several Times from Health Regulators, HUFFINGTON 
POST, Oct. 23, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/23/meningitis-outbreak-new-
england-compounding-center_n_2004234.html. 
 3. Todd Wallack, Bankruptcy Likely for Framingham Firm Linked to Meningitis Infections, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 19, 2012, http://www.boston.com/business/technology/2012/10/19/ 
new-england-compounding-center-likely-file-bankruptcy-stop-flood-lawsuits/PuUIIvr1CVFy7n 
ubfbTbwO/story.html. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See id. 
 6. The FDA’s multiple October 2012 inspection reports are available at Inspectional 
Observations from the U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Barry J. Cadden, Owner, New England 
Compounding Pharmacy Inc. (Oct. 26, 2012), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ 
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofGlobalRegulatoryOperationsandPolicy/ORA/ORAElectron 
icReadingRoom/UCM325980.pdf (reporting vials of an injectable drug containing a 
“greenish black foreign matter” with other vials containing “what appeared to be white 
filamentous material” with sterility samples revealing the presence of viable microbial growth 
and fungal morphological features). 
 7. News Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Reports Conditions Observed at New 
England Compounding Center Facility (Oct. 26, 2012), available at http://www.fda.gov/ 
NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm325994.htm. 
 8. Chelsea Conaboy & Kay Lazar, New England Compounding did not Follow Sterility 
Procedures, Investigators Find; State Orders Regular Inspections of Similar Pharmacies, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 23, 2012, http://www.boston.com/whitecoatnotes/2012/10/23/new-
england-compounding-did-not-follow-sterility-procedures-state-revokes-pharmacy-license-and 
-orders-regular-inspections-similar-compounders/tHIuCSNUWjP1IVs5OhUHNI/story.html. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
For three decades, state and federal enforcement agencies have 
invested significant energy in attempted reforms of the health care industry9 
with particular recent focus on the manufacturers of pharmaceuticals and 
medical devices. As the biggest purchaser of these products in the United 
States,10 the government has particular interest in product usage that is 
actually or potentially harmful to patients or is inappropriate,11 thereby 
unnecessarily driving up the nation’s healthcare bill. As such, enforcement 
agencies have pursued new theories borne out of fraud, waste, and abuse 
laws to reform, in a fundamental way, how manufacturers of drugs and 
devices price, promote, and sell their products. 
The failure of two disparate regulatory regimes has created the 
environment into which the Justice Department (DOJ) and Health and 
Human Services Office of Inspector General (OIG) have intervened with 
their aggressive reform agenda. First is the perverse marketing incentive 
created by the relationship between the patent laws and Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approval, particularly with drugs. Second is the failure 
of the laws governing directors’ exercise of their fiduciary duties to impel 
boards to pursue their company’s strict adherence to the law. These failures 
have created what enforcement agencies believe to be an atmosphere of 
corporate impunity in an industry whose products are essential to the world’s 
 
 9. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) created the 
Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program, which is jointly overseen by the Attorney 
General and the Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General. Jason Chimon et 
al., Health Care Fraud, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 783, 821-22 (2011). 
 10. See id. at 785; Insurance and Medicare/Medicaid, ABOUT.COM (2012), http://pha 
rma.about.com/od/Insurance-and-Medicare/Insurance-And-Medicare-MedicaId.htm. 
Referred to as the Big 4, the “four largest purchasers of pharmaceuticals within the Federal 
government [are] Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), Department of Defense (DoD), Public 
Health Service (PHS), and Coast Guard. . . . [T]he Big 4 often get pricing below the [Federal 
Supply Schedule] on brand name drugs because these drugs are subject to a maximum 
statutory price called the Federal Ceiling Price.” 340B Dictionary, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., 
http://www.hrsa.gov/opa/faqs/dictionary/index.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2012). 
 11. Approximately 21% of prescriptions overall in the medical office setting were off-label 
solely in terms of the indication or purpose for which the medication was prescribed, although 
some categories of medications—specifically, cardiac medications and antiasthmatics for 
allergies—had much higher rates, approaching or exceeding 50%. David C. Radley et al., 
Off-label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 
1025 (2006). Off-label prescribing of medications for psychiatric conditions appears to be 
higher than that for other medical conditions. Id.; Hua Chen et al., Off-Label Use of 
Antidepressant, Anticonvulsant, and Antipsychotic Medications Among Georgia Medicaid 
Enrollees in 2001, 67 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 972, 975 (2006) (stating 75% of antidepressant 
recipients and 80% of anticonvulsant recipients received at least one of these medications off 
label). 
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health and welfare. The indispensability of drugs and devices has made it 
almost impossible to criminally prosecute life science companies because 
convictions would bar them from contracting with most nations’ 
governments, which would thereby deny their citizenry access to (potentially) 
essential medicines.12 It is this unique set of circumstances that justifies the 
DOJ’s use of the Responsible Corporate Officer (RCO) Doctrine against, 
and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) debarment from 
Federal healthcare programs of, officers and directors when the legal 
doctrine is violated, and the facts underlying the violation and the threats to 
public health are clear. 
Drug and device manufacturers reap huge profits on a product while it 
remains on patent, that is, it retains market exclusivity — thereafter, generics 
enter the market creating price competition and reducing the sales volume 
for every market participant. But they have to get the product to market, as 
the period of clinical trials and FDA market approval eats into the life of the 
patent;13 the incentive, then, is to test the product in a narrow population for 
a limited purpose, to ensure speed and positive trial outcomes. Once the 
product hits the market, the incentive reverses — to promote the product for 
as many potential patients and uses as plausible, thereby enhancing 
revenue as much as possible during the period of market exclusivity. 
While the FDA and OIG posit that the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act 
prohibits “off label marketing,”14 physicians are not subject to FDA 
 
 12. See Improving Efforts to Combat Health Care Fraud: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 112th Cong. 5-6 (2011) [hereinafter 
Morris Testimony] (statement of Lewis Morris, Chief Counsel to the Inspector General, U.S. 
Department of Health & Human Services). This applies outside of the United States as well; 
industrialized health care systems are government–sponsored in one form or another, and 
drug prices are regulated or negotiated; consequently, the government is the primary 
purchaser of drugs and devices. See Dennis S. Corgill, Distributing Products Under The 
Nonprofit Institutions Act: Price Discrimination, Arbitrage, And Fraud In The Pharmaceutical 
Industry, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1383, 1398 n.45; see James B. Roche, Health Care In America: 
Why We Need Universal Health Care and Why We Need It Now, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 
1013, 1028-35 (2001). 
 13. See Isabelle Bibet-Kalinyak, A Critical Analysis of Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.: Pandora’s 
Box at Best, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 191, 194-95 (2012). A pharmaceutical patent lasts for 
twenty years. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). While a portion of this time is obviously lost 
during to the approval process, the Hatch-Waxman Act restored some of that time, with a five 
year cap. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1590 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 
21, 35, 42 U.S.C. (2006)); see also Katrice Bridges Copeland, Enforcing Integrity, 87 IND. 
L.J. 1033, 1038 n.20 (2012). 
 14. John N. Joseph et al., Is Sorrell the Death Knell for FDA’s Off-Label Marketing 
Restrictions?, 5 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 3, 4 (2012). As observed by a recent article, “there is 
no specific FDA regulation that expressly prohibits off-label marketing or that defines what 
activities qualify as off-label marketing. Rather, FDA’s enforcement actions typically are 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
82 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 6:77 
jurisdiction and may legally prescribe drugs “off label” for unapproved uses, 
or in populations in which the drug was not tested.15 Further complicating 
the matter, it is frequently the case that such off-label use represents the 
standard of care for treatment in certain circumstances,16 and the off-label 
use may be eligible for Medicare and/or Medicaid reimbursement.17 While 
the FDA has jurisdiction over off-label marketing activities, it is under-funded 
and has been ineffective in stopping the well-funded and pervasive practices 
of manufacturers’ sales divisions.18 
The marketing techniques that have so attracted the government’s 
attention also create conflicts of interest that could result in inappropriate 
prescribing or product selection.19 These inducements to physicians to 
prescribe particular products have been extensively categorized elsewhere, 
and have included expensive meals and gifts, free trips to conferences in 
exotic locales, payments for sham research and attribution for ghost written 
articles, excessive payments for legitimate research, payments to speak 
about company products to peer physicians, underwriting of continuing 
medical education programs, and any variety of consulting arrangements 
that may or may not be legitimate.20 An important role that drug and device 
sales representatives, sometimes referred to as detailers, have served as a 
significant resource for physicians struggling to remain current about the 
latest treatments available for their patients.21 These detailers focus on new, 
and therefore the most expensive drugs (those that are on patent),22 do not 
 
premised on the theory that a drug is illegally “misbranded” under the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (FDCA) if it is marketed for a use inconsistent with the directions on its label.” Id. 
 15. 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2006) (stating that “[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to 
limit or interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any 
legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health 
care practitioner-patient relationship.”). 
 16. Erin E. Bennett, Comment, Central Hudson-Plus: Why Off-Label Pharmaceutical 
Speech Will Find Its Voice, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 459, 460-61 (2012). 
 17. Copeland, supra note 13, at 1043. 
 18. The FDA may also be limited in its efforts by the First Amendment. Joseph et al., supra 
note 14, at 7. 
 19. See generally TRACY MILLER ET AL., SETON HALL CTR. FOR HEALTH & PHARM. LAW & 
POLICY, DRUG AND DEVICE PROMOTION: CHARTING A COURSE FOR POLICY REFORM (2009), 
available at http://law.shu.edu/ProgramsCenters/HealthTechIP/upload/whitepaperjan 
2009.pdf (discussing conflicts of interest resulting from industry-physician financial 
relationships). 
 20. Id. at 1, 10-12, 14. 
 21. Id. at 1, 11-12. 
 22. IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 2008), abrogated by Sorrell v. 
IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). As described by the First Circuit: 
“Detailing involves tailored one-on-one visits by pharmaceutical sales representatives 
with physicians and their staffs. This is time-consuming and expensive work, not suited 
to the marketing of lower-priced bioequivalent generic drugs (drugs that are 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICER DOCTRINE 83 
engage in a comparative effectiveness analysis of these new products with 
older and less costly products or alternatives, such as diet and exercise,23 
and have been known to liberally push the products’ prescription for patient 
groups on whom they have not been tested, i.e., children, or for uses that 
have not been approved by the FDA.24 Manufacturers supply their sales 
representatives with copious amounts of information about their physicians’ 
prescribing patterns and background to facilitate these sales pitches.25 
What is objectionable about the medical device industry’s relationship 
with physicians is more difficult to sort out, because companies have 
relationships with many physicians that necessarily go beyond the sales visits 
described above.26 For many devices, physicians require manufacturer 
training before using the product.27 Further, once trained on a particular 
device, inertia or company loyalty may cause a physician to resist using 
another product, even if better or more cost effective for patients. But, the 
challenges go even deeper. In many instances, the actual inventor of the 
device is a physician who then sells or licenses the patent to a device 
company, which creates a symbiotic relationship, as the inventor-physician 
remains a key expert regarding that device. Whether he or she is 
indispensible to testing that device and teaching other physicians about it 
remains a challenging question. Whether he or she should be deployed as 
an expert speaker at continuing medical education meetings is difficult — 
where is the line between product promotion and scientific conversation? 
Further, medical device companies claim that, with new or technically 
 
pharmacologically indistinguishable from their brand-name counterparts save for 
potential differences in rates of absorption). The higher profit margins associated with 
brand-name drugs leaves the personal solicitation field open to brand-name drug 
manufacturers, who in the year 2000 spent roughly $4,000,000,000 on detailing.” 
Id. 
 23. See Richard S. Saver, Heath Care Reform’s Wild Card: The Uncertain Effectiveness of 
Comparative Effectiveness Research, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 2147, 2175, 2203-04 (2011). 
 24. See generally Bibet-Kalinyak, supra note 13. Off-label prescribing is a common 
practice, particularly in certain medical specialties such as oncology and neuropsychiatry. It is 
also commonplace in certain populations such as pediatrics, pregnant patients, and “orphan 
disease” patients.” Id. at 237. 
 25. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2659-60. 
 26. See Bruce Patsner, Problems Associated with Direct-to-Consumer Advertising (DTCA) 
of Restricted, Implantable Medical Devices: Should the Current Regulatory Approach be 
Changed?, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 2 (2009) (discussing unique relationship between 
physicians and the device industry, which can enable device companies to circumvent 
restrictions on product promotion by use of physicians as surrogates and various financial 
relationships). 
 27. See Surgeons for Sale: Conflicts and Consultant Payment in the Medical Device 
Industry: Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) [hereinafter 
Demske Testimony] (statement of Gregory E. Demske, Assistant Inspector General for Legal 
Affairs, Office of Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services). 
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difficult products in particular, it is essential that company representatives 
see patients with the physician to calibrate the device, or in the operating 
suite to aid the physician in choosing the correct device or otherwise dealing 
with technical questions that arise.28 A new trend is physician-owned device 
distributorships.29 Critics claim that the companies should be training the 
physicians and their staffs to use their products independently, without 
manufacturers’ representatives hovering about or becoming part of the 
physician-patient relationship.30 Whether these interactions comprise 
important collaborative product development or promotional activity 
continues to challenge the government. 
To summarize, life science companies earn significant income on their 
products while they remain on patent. Initial clinical trials and the resultant 
FDA approved labels are generally for narrow uses and populations that 
frequently do not represent the full spectrum of uses, populations, modes of 
delivery or dosage amounts for which physicians ultimately prescribe the 
drug.31 Companies benefit by marketing for this full spectrum of alternative 
uses; the government objects to such marketing because it lacks evidence 
supported by clinical trials.32 No incentive exists for companies to engage in 
clinical trials for these expanded uses due to the extraordinary cost, which 
may not be recovered while the product remains on patent, the fact that the 
trial most likely will not conclude before the patent expires, and because the 
trials may produce adverse evidence that undermines sales.33 
The ineffectiveness of the law of directors’ fiduciary duties is the second 
regulatory failure that may explain OIG and DOJ stepping up their 
enforcement actions against life science companies. The standards of review 
courts invoke in corporate fiduciary duty cases rarely result in findings of 
director liability in civil suits.34 While the Delaware courts have expanded the 
duty of loyalty, debate persists over whether the obligation of good faith 
subsumed by the duty of loyalty requires strict adherence to the law. 
Increasingly, commentators and perhaps some judges view certain 
 
 28. David S. Hilzenrath, Medical Sales Reps Work Alongside Doctors, Even in Operating 
Rooms, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2009/12/24/AR2009122403368.html. 
 29. Demske Testimony, supra note 27, at 2. 
 30. Hilzenrath, supra note 28. 
 31. See James O’Reilly & Amy Dalal, Off-Label or Out of Bounds? Prescriber and 
Marketer Liability for Unapproved Uses of FDA-Approved Drugs, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 295, 
298 (2003). 
 32. Id. at 300. 
 33. Id. at 304, 307. 
 34. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING 
PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 180 (11th ed. 2010) (including the business 
judgment rule discussion in Sullivan v. Hammer, 1990 WL 114223 (Del. Ch. 1990)). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICER DOCTRINE 85 
regulations not as limits or prohibitions, but rather options or taxes, 
especially, as is the case with life sciences marketing, when the revenue net 
of sanctions is significant.35 
As might be expected, OIG and DOJ have an entirely different 
perspective. These enforcement agencies hold the view that many of the 
operators in the life sciences industry are corrupt. Consequently, they seek 
structural reform to make life science companies better corporate citizens.36 
At an operational level, these enforcement agencies push the boundaries of 
the False Claims Act37 and Anti-Kickback Statute38 to get inside these 
companies to change their culture and organization, and to address the 
specific practices prosecutors wish to see eliminated.39 
Specifically, OIG and DOJ have imposed elaborate corporate 
compliance programs,40 entered into onerous corporate integrity 
 
 35. See Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 
76 N.C. L. REV. 1265, 1279-80 (1998). 
 36. Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 953, 
965 (2009); Kathleen M. Boozang & Simone Handler-Hutchison, “Monitoring” Corporate 
Corruption: DOJ’s Use of Deferred Prosecution Agreements in Health Care, 35 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 89, 89-90 (2009); Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 
853, 890 (2007). Reforms to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations similarly 
aspired to corporate compliance facilitating corporate transformation. 2011 FEDERAL 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a)(2) (2011) (describing an effective compliance and 
ethics program as one which “promote[s] an organizational culture that encourages ethical 
conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law”). 
 37. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2006). 
 38. 42 U.S.C § 1320a-7b (2006). 
 39. Outside of the United States, the Justice Department and Securities and Exchange 
Commission are employing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to achieve many of the same 
ends. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)-(h), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3, 78ff 
(2006)). “Of note is that France recently enacted a law specifically addressing off-label 
promotion.” Joseph Emmerich et al., France’s New Framework for Regulating Off-Label Drug 
Use, 367 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1279, 1279-1281 (2012). This Article focuses on domestic 
reforms and does not address the two extremely important policy questions that hover over this 
entire debate. First is the argument that prohibiting off-label promotion discourages off-label 
prescribing, which is an activity important to innovation and many patients’ health. See 
generally Sandra H. Johnson, Polluting Medical Judgment? False Assumptions in the Pursuit of 
False Claims Regarding Off-Label Prescribing, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 63, 72 (2008). 
The second argument revolves around whether the FDA has the constitutional power under the 
First Amendment to regulate the provision of truthful and non-misleading product information 
to physicians. Kate Greenwood, The Ban on “Off-Label” Pharmaceutical Promotion: 
Constitutionally Permissible Prophylaxis Against False or Misleading Commercial Speech?, 37 
AM. J.L. & MED. 278, 280 (2011); Joseph et al., supra note 14, at 4-5; see, e.g., Bibet-
Kalinyak, supra note 13, at 191-92. 
 40. See Morris Testimony, supra note 12, at 7. 
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agreements (CIA)41 and deferred prosecution agreements (DPA),42 and 
imposed fines recently exceeding the one billion dollar mark to achieve 
these goals.43 While some business practices in the life sciences industry 
have unquestionably and significantly changed,44 it remains an open 
question whether the government’s efforts have accomplished the ultimate 
goals of transforming corporate governance.45 Many hold the belief that the 
continuing parade of CIAs suggests that fundamental transformation has not 
occurred, and business continues as usual.46 
Given the unremitting pressure of government enforcement, what could 
explain industry behavior? An appealing hypothesis is that companies treat 
the astounding fines assessed against them, as well as the costs of corporate 
compliance,47 as a cost of doing business.48 Specifically, during the market-
exclusivity period conferred by patent law, the revenues generated so greatly 
exceed the fines levied that the economically rational choice is to sell 
product, even while risking49 penalties that would be exorbitant in other 
 
 41. See generally Thomas F. O’Neil III and T. Brendan Kennedy, Answering to a Higher 
Authority: Sovereign-Mandated Oversight in the Board Room and the C-Suite, 17 FORDHAM J. 
CORP. FIN. L. 299, 348 (2012). 
 42. See Boozang & Handler-Hutchinson, supra note 36, at 91. 
 43. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and 
Pay $3 Billion to Resolve Fraud Allegations and Failure to Report Safety Data (July 2, 2012), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/July/12-civ-842.html. 
 44. The OIG’s operating assumption is that “health care fraud . . . migrates.” Daniel R. 
Levinson, Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Highlights of the Keynote Address 
at the Health Care Compliance Association Annual Compliance Institute 3 (April 19, 2010), 
available at http://oig.hhs.gov/testimony/docs/2010/HCCAIGKeynoteSummary.pdf. That is, 
when the government clamps down on a particular behavior, another one replaces it. Id. 
 45. See Baer, supra note 36, at 965 (suggesting that corporate compliance and other 
Sarbanes-Oxley reforms have failed to stem corporate crime or affect corporate norms). 
 46. See Copeland, supra note 13, at 1034. 
 47. Actually, the marginal cost of corporate compliance is probably minimal with each 
new CIA. Id. at 1055; Morris Testimony, supra note 12, at 6. All major companies have 
robust compliance programs by now. Thus, the marginal cost of adhering to the specific 
training dictates of a new CIA is likely inconsequential. Copeland, supra note 13, at 1055, 
1063-64; Morris Testimony, supra note 12, at 6. 
 48. In testimony before the House Committee on Ways and Means, HHS OIG then-Chief 
Counsel Lewis Morris stated, “[w]e are concerned that the providers that engage in health care 
fraud may consider civil penalties and criminal fines a cost of doing business.” Morris 
Testimony, supra note 12, at 6. 
 49. And the point is that detection and penalty assessment is only a risk. As described by 
Professor Williams, 
“[r]ather, part of the calculation to violate the law includes a calculation of the 
probability that the violation will go undetected; or if detected, that it will go 
unprosecuted for any one of a plethora of reasons; or if prosecuted, that liability will 
not be established; or if liability is established, that the penalty will be lower than the 
profits obtained; or that the penalty will not be upheld on appeal in any event.” 
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contexts.50 This behavior is analogous to contract law’s theory of efficient 
breach.51 Life science companies pay a tax in lieu of regulatory adherence, 
which appears to be a rational choice during the patent life of their 
products.52 
So, the question becomes, if we agree that the sought after changes in 
corporate behavior are desirable, and all else has failed in affecting change 
in corporate behavior, is there anything that will capture the attention of 
these companies to induce change? The ultimate problem is that the U.S. 
pharmaceutical industry is “too big to nail.”53 It comprises a handful of 
multinational companies that produce multiple products at least some of 
which are essential to the life, health and well-being of patients throughout 
the world. The essential nature of these companies’ products limits the 
government’s ability to criminally prosecute them. Recall that mere 
indictment of Arthur Anderson resulted in its demise.54 An additional 
consequence to a life sciences company convicted of a crime is exclusion 
 
Williams, supra note 35, at 1279-80. 
 50. Copeland, supra note 13, at 1034; see also, Johnson, supra note 39, at 114-15 
(noting that Parke-Davis paid over $455 million to both the federal and state governments for 
off-label prescriptions for Neurontin in 2004, while having previously earned sales up to 
nearly $2.5 billion in 2003 for off-label uses). 
 51. As explained by Professor Humbach, 
“[e]xtending the rationale of efficient breach theory to legal and regulatory contexts, 
the corresponding idea would be a kind of ‘theory of efficient crime.’ Under this theory, 
whenever the benefit to the corporation from legal or regulatory violations would 
exceed the applicable fines and penalties (presumably discounted to reflect the risk of 
getting caught), then the corporation should commit the violations. Forsaking the 
benefits of breaking the law would be inefficient and a waste. So if a board makes a 
rational choice to take the corporation beyond the limits of the law, that choice (it is 
argued) should be protected by the business judgment rule.” 
John A. Humbach, Director Liability for Corporate Crimes: Lawyers as Safe Haven?, 55 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 437, 439-40 (2010-11). 
 52. But see Williams, supra note 35, at 1278-80 (repudiating the efficient-breach theory, 
claiming that “the law ought to be understood to impose a prima facie obligation to comply, 
even when unprofitable”). 
 53. Morris Testimony, supra note 12, at 5-6. In testimony before the House Committee 
on Ways and Means, HHS OIG Chief Counsel Lewis Morris stated that 
“[s]ome hospital systems, pharmaceutical manufacturers and other providers play such 
a critical role in the care delivery system that they may believe that they are ‘too big to 
fire’ and thus OIG would never exclude them and thereby risk compromising the 
welfare of our beneficiaries.” 
Id. 
 54. Boozang & Handler-Hutchinson, supra note 36, at 96; Christopher McNamara, How 
the Decisions in Favor of the Stein Thirteen Will Affect the Litigation of Corporate Crime and 
Department of Justice Policies and Expand the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 933, 956 n.240 (2009). 
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from any Federal healthcare program,55 which would make the drug 
unaffordable for significant portions of the population. The company would 
likely go out of existence, thereby threatening to deny the public the drug 
entirely56 while the company would presumably sell or license the patent to 
another company, it would take significant time for the licensee to gear up 
to manufacture the drug, which may not be worthwhile, depending upon the 
remaining life on the patent.57 Sale of the entire company to avoid 
debarment would be wholly dependent upon the OIG’s consent;58 given its 
recent compelled sale in the Synthes case, it seems that it would be open to 
such a solution.59 Such a sale would not relieve the company of its fines or 
CIA obligations, which may make it an unappealing acquisition.60 Medical 
device companies are much more numerous, with many bringing only one 
significant product to market.61 While perhaps not too big to nail in a 
general sense, the niches such companies fill are often critical to those using 
their products. 
 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2006); 42 C.F.R. § 1001.101 (2011). Regulations provide for 
the exclusion of pharmaceutical and medical device manufactures, as well as others in the 
supply chain, even if not direct recipients of federal reimbursement. 42 C.F.R. § 1000.10. 
 56. See Morris Testimony, supra note 12, at 6. 
 57. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006) (stating the term of a patent is twenty years). 
 58. Corporate Integrity Agreements traditionally include a Sale of Unit or Location Clause 
requiring the signee to notify OIG. This clause further states that the CIA will be binding on the 
purchaser of the business unit or location. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND SYNTHES, INC. 31-
32 (2010), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/synthes_inc_092320 
10.pdf [hereinafter Synthes CIA]; see, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR 
GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND GLAXOSMITHKLINE, LLC. 50-
51 (2012), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/GlaxoSmithKline_LLC_062 
82012.pdf. 
 59. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DIVESTITURE 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVICES AND SYNTHES INC. 2 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/ 
Pharma-Device/synthes_divestagrmt.pdf. 
 60. E.g., Synthes CIA, supra note 58, at 32. It may be that the offending company’s 
assets could be sold under the Bankruptcy Code, leaving the sale proceeds to satisfy the fines 
and other liabilities. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2006). Such a process recently was used with regard 
to the automakers. See generally Stephanie Ben-Shai & Stephen J. Lubben, Involuntary 
Creditors and Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 U.B.C. L. REV. 253 (2012). 
 61. MED. DEVICE MFRS. ASS’N & NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY AND 
VENTURE CAPITAL: A FRUITFUL YET FRAGILE ECOSYSTEM 2 (2009), available at http://www.me 
dicaldevices.org/node/656.; see Yair Holtzman, The U.S. Medical Device Industry in 2012: 
Challenges at Home and Abroad, MED. DEVICE & DIAGNOSTIC INDUSTRY (July 17, 2012), 
http://www.mddionline.com/article/medtech-2012-SWOT. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICER DOCTRINE 89 
Circumscribed by this reality, FDA and OIG have upped the ante and 
are now employing a rarely used doctrine that holds criminally responsible 
those corporate officials who are in a position to discover and prevent the 
illegal behaviors that present a threat to the public health that occur on their 
watch.62 Following conviction, OIG may exclude the officials from the 
Federal healthcare programs, which ends the individual’s career in 
healthcare.63 The invocation of this doctrine with resultant exclusion from 
Federal healthcare programs has provoked outrage.64 
This Article accepts the constraints of “too big to nail” under which 
enforcement agencies are laboring in their oversight of life science 
companies, and that the tools used thus far by enforcement agencies may 
be insufficient to capture the attention of the most egregious actors.65 It 
concludes that, while the RCO Doctrine may be an appropriate tool for 
corporate reform, and in some rare instances should be available to 
prosecute and exclude directors as well, the doctrine should not be 
employed to address behaviors about which the government’s public policy 
rationale is not unassailable, the law is in dispute, or about which little 
recent case law exists.66 Specifically, while the RCO Doctrine may be 
appropriate to pervasive false marketing of a product which threatens 
patient harm, it is ill-suited to situations where the underlying legal theory is 
largely untested through litigation, or involves off-label marketing that 
represents the standard of care, or uses for patients with no or few treatment 
options who appear to be helped by the product. 
II.  IT PAYS TO BREAK THE LAW 
Why do life science companies continue to have so many legal 
problems, even in the face of exorbitant fines and investigations that are 
 
 62. See discussion infra Part II.B.1; see also Levinson, supra note 44, at 5 (explaining that 
OIG is focused on holding corporate officials accountable for health care fraud using the 
“Responsible Corporate Officer” doctrine). 
 63. Morris Testimony, supra note 12, at 5. 
 64. The Washington Legal Foundation, for example, was very involved in the Friedman 
case from its inception, including the filing of briefs. Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation 
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1, Goldenheim, DAB No. CR1883, 2009 WL 
2912444 (H.H.S. 2009), available at http://www.wlf.org/Upload/litigation/briefs/Golden 
heimv.IG-WLFAmicus.pdf; Brief of Amicus Curiae Washington Legal Foundation at 1, 
Friedman v. Sebelius, 672 F. Supp. 2d 54 (D.D.C. 2009), available at http://www.wlf.org/Up 
load/litigation/briefs/FriedmanvSebelius-WLFAmicus.pdf; Brief of Washington Legal 
Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants Urging Reversal at 1-2, Friedman v. 
Sebelius, No. 11–5028, 2012 WL 3055520 (D.C. 2011), available at http://www.wlf.org/Up 
load/litigation/briefs/FriedmanvSebelius-WLFAmicusJune29.pdf. 
 65. See supra Part I. 
 66. See infra Part II.B.3, II.C. 
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onerous? Industry would respond fairly, many of the most offensive 
promotional practices have been significantly reined in at many 
companies.67 Further, the institution of Corporate Compliance programs 
has impacted employee behavior in many settings. The days of extravagant 
weekend conferences at spas or on cruises have disappeared, as have the 
innumerable opportunities for free meals, hard-to-get tickets, and the variety 
of equipment and desk accessories that used to come physicians’ way for 
their birthdays and holidays.68 Other questionable practices, however, 
continue. Ghost writing seems not to have been eliminated, and companies 
now employ medical science liaisons, generally medical doctors or Ph.D.s, 
to answer physicians’ questions about off-label uses, which the industry 
claims comprises scientific communication not subject to FDA regulation.69 
They also continue to distribute peer-reviewed studies of off-label practices 
under the watchful eye of the FDA, although such personal conversations 
are impossible to monitor for compliance.70 
Government would respond that the fundamental structural problems 
have not been resolved, and that true ethos reform has yet to occur. 
Related somewhat to the prior response, is that it makes economic sense 
to ignore certain laws, even if at the risk of incurring significant fines. OIG 
and DOJ to the contrary, many would argue that there is nothing wrong with 
life science companies making this choice. That is, to choose to “pay the 
price” to violate certain regulations,71 sometimes referred to as the “efficient 
breach of public law.”72 Professor Coffee succinctly explains the efficient 
breach perspective: 
Legal rules that exact a “price” thus straddle the deterrent/compensatory 
watershed because they seek to do both; that is, they seek to make victims 
whole and to induce precautions that avert future injuries. Clearly, their 
purpose is not prohibitory in the sense of forbidding entirely the activity in 
 
 67. See Robert Steinbrook, Physician-Industry Relations – Will Fewer Gifts Make a 
Difference?, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 557, 557-58 (2009). 
 68. Id.; see PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., CODE ON INTERACTIONS WITH HEALTHCARE 
PROFESSIONALS (2008), available at http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/108/phrma_mar 
keting_code_2008.pdf. 
 69. Drug Companies Float Off-Label Reg Limits; FDA Mulls Scientific Exchange, FDA 
WEEK, Apr. 6, 2012, at 2; see generally MINORITY STAFF REPORT, S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 
111TH CONG., GHOSTWRITING IN MEDICAL LITERATURE 2 (2010) (“Medical ghostwriting is a 
practice where pharmaceutical or device companies hire medical education, marketing or 
communications companies to draft articles that are presented to prominent physicians and 
scientists to sign on as authors to increase the likelihood that the article will be published in 
important medical journals.”). 
 70. Adriane Fugh-Berman & Douglas Melnick, Off-Label Promotion, On-Target Sales, 5 
PLOS MED. 1432, 1434 (2008). 
 71. Williams, supra note 35, at 1279. 
 72. Id. at 1267. 
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question by imposing penalties greater than the social costs created by the 
activity. Indeed, if the defendant's benefit from the conduct exceeds the 
victim's loss (adjusted to reflect the limited likelihood of apprehension), the 
defendant is free under optimal deterrence theory to engage in conduct that 
harms others at will, so long as the defendant pays all compensation.73 
The concept of efficient breach in the corporate context represents a 
determination that it is economically preferable to violate an under-enforced 
law due to a calculation that the probability of enforcement occurring at all, 
factored by the likelihood that the particular actor will be detected factored 
by the probability of liability represented by the ultimate fine is less than the 
benefits to the corporate actor of not following the law.74 Intuitively, we 
know that even law and economics theorists would not take the position with 
respect to all crimes. Rather, the consensus of the law and economics 
literature on the strategic decision to breach and pay is “that committing 
acts that are malum in se cannot be ethically defended with a simple 
willingness to pay the price.”75 However, in the case of “matters that are 
malum prohibitum, a strategy of breach-and-pay not only makes sense and 
should be legally permitted, but is also ethically defensible.”76 
On the side of enforcement, Professor Cynthia Williams posits that the 
law represents obligations applicable to all, including corporations.77 She 
rejects the theory of a “private right to violate public law when it is 
profitable”78 as a theory that over-emphasizes shareholder wealth-
maximization thereby leading to ethically and politically problematic 
corporate behavior that threatens society and our democracy.79 Williams 
advances a vision that is more public-regarding, affording both freedom 
and concomitant responsibilities to corporations — the option to buy out of 
adhering to health, safety and other regulations is contrary to the 
corporation’s obligations as a citizen, according to Williams.80 
Several factors distinguish the behavior of the life sciences industry from 
that described in the literature on efficient breach. First, the pharmaceutical 
industry would argue that it is no longer operating in an environment of 
under-enforcement. In 2011, the Federal Government recovered $2.4 
 
 73. John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law 
Models – And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1883 (1992). 
 74. See generally Daniel T. Ostas, Legal Loopholes and Underenforced Laws: Examining 
the Ethical Dimensions of Corporate Legal Strategy, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 487 (2009) (examining 
arguments in favor of efficient breach). 
 75. Id. at 497. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Williams, supra note 35, at 1271-72. 
 78. Id. at 1377-78. 
 79. Id. at 1381-82. 
 80. See id. at 1385. 
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billion in fraud judgments and settlements — this amount does not reflect 
state or joint federal-state recoveries.81 Notably in 2011, HHS allocated 
$3.4 million in funding for a FDA Pharmaceutical Fraud Pilot Program to 
enhance the FDA’s criminal investigatory work, with a focus on “fraudulent 
marketing schemes, application fraud, clinical trial fraud, and flagrant 
manufacturing-related violations related to biologics, drugs, and medical 
devices.”82 Further, laws that govern the healthcare sector increasingly 
require self-reporting of detected deviations from the law,83 with an 
expectation of mitigation of sentencing articulated in the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, and increased fines if the behavior remains unreported by a 
corporate entity to the government.84 
In the absence of data, there are reasons to believe that even stepped-
up law enforcement remains an inadequate response to efficient breaches 
that continue to generate significant revenue, which likely explains the 
continuing and dramatic escalation of fines in the last year. First of all, CIAs 
last only three to five years.85 Companies’ repeated settlements with the 
government, albeit involving different subsidiaries and products, suggest that 
any real reform that might be limited to the period of the settlement 
agreement and to the particular products and corporate divisions subject to 
the agreement. Also unclear is whether the bad publicity attendant to 
government settlements adversely affects the largest life science companies 
— physicians are not going to stop prescribing products that patients 
require, and most shareholders are unaffected by such publicity, especially if 
the entire industry is subject to the continued disapprobation. 
In the healthcare context, the government goal seems not merely to 
eliminate behaviors that are costly to government programs and potentially 
harmful to beneficiaries, but to accomplish wholesale reform of corporate 
norms. 
A. Fiduciary Duties as Aspirations 
Corporate law directly addresses expectations about individual officers’ 
and directors’ management. It too is inadequate to inspire “an ethical tone 
at the top” or general corporate ethos reform. In fact, the weakness of 
 
 81. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE 
CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 1 (2012), available at http://oig. 
hhs.gov/publications/docs/hcfac/hcfacreport2011.pdf. 
 82. Id. at 73. 
 83. See, e.g., Publication of the OIG’s Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol, 63 Fed. Reg. 
58,399, 58,400 (Oct. 30, 1998). 
 84. 2011 FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 36, § 8C2.5. 
 85. Sharon Finegan, The False Claims Act and Corporate Criminal Liability: Qui Tam 
Actions, Corporate Integrity Agreements and the Overlap of Criminal and Civil Law, 111 PENN. 
ST. L. REV. 625, 663 (2007). 
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corporate law is that the concepts are largely aspirational rather than 
mandatory: directors do not perceive they are breaking the law when they 
behave in a negligent but not grossly negligent fashion, or approve a 
transaction that is fair but not in the corporation’s best interests in a 
conflicted transaction.86 The absence of liability, it is reasoned, must mean 
that the directors acted within the law.87 While Delaware opinions 
themselves attempt to distinguish between aspirational ideals and that for 
which fiduciaries may be liable,88 the question is whether the Delaware case 
law stands for the proposition that directors’ fiduciary duties are themselves 
merely aspirational ideals that are actually unattainable.89 
Directors’ and officers’ risk of liability90 for breach of their fiduciary 
duties of care and loyalty is low.91 The duty of care requires boards to 
engage ordinary care in the processes by which they make decisions, and to 
supervise and monitor the activities of corporate managers; however, 
liability results only when the fiduciaries’ behavior constitutes gross 
negligence.92 Thus, while the duty of care employs a negligence standard, 
the standard of review in actually applying the law is one of gross 
 
 86. See Julian Velasco, The Role of Aspiration in Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 54 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 519, 521-22 (2012). 
 87. See generally id. (summarizing the literature that suggests that the standards of 
conduct articulate aspirational norms, while the standards of review determine liability). 
 88. “But Delaware law does not – indeed, the common law cannot—hold fiduciaries 
liable for a failure to comply with the aspirational ideal of best practices. . .” In re Walt Disney 
Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 679 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
 89. See Velasco, supra note 86, at 534-35. 
 90. In a case of first impression, the Delaware Supreme Court held that corporate 
officers’ fiduciary duties are identical to those of directors. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 
695, 708-09 (Del. 2009). 
 91. See Velasco, supra note 86, at 551 (asserting that directors are rarely held liable for 
breaching fiduciary duties of care and loyalty). 
 92. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749-50 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“In 
the duty of care context with respect to corporate fiduciaries, gross negligence has been 
defined as a “‘reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the whole body of 
stockholders’ or actions which are ‘without the bounds of reason.’”); see Thomas A. Uebler, 
Shareholder Police Power: Shareholders’ Ability to Hold Directors Accountable for Intentional 
Violations of Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 199, 203 nn. 17-18 (2008). But, even in such a case 
liability may not result, due to the following provision in Delaware Code Section 102(b)(7) 
which authorizes the inclusion in a certificate of incorporation of the following: 
[A] provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the 
corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of a fiduciary duty as 
a director, provided that such provisions shall not eliminate or limit the liability for a 
director; (i) for any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation or its 
stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional 
misconduct or a violation of law; . . . . 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011). 
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negligence.93 Directors’ duty of loyalty requires them to give primacy to the 
corporation’s interests, that is, to avoid conflicts of interest.94 The law’s 
application does not preclude conflicted transactions, but requires them to 
be fair.95 Only recently, the duty of loyalty also encompasses the directors’ 
obligation to act in good faith.96 
The business judgment rule creates the gap between the standard of 
conduct and standard of review applied to cases involving directors’ 
fiduciary duties.97 This rule affords corporate boards a “judicial presumption 
that a business decision of the board of directors was well-informed, made 
in good faith, and decided in the honest belief that it would benefit the 
corporation and its shareholders.”98 Delaware cases regularly reaffirm that 
the duty of care is not a tool for substantive second-guessing the content of 
board decisions.99 The law seeks to avoid the mistakes that occasionally 
emerge from the litigation process, specifically, “the over-enforcement of 
fiduciary duties,” which would discourage risk-taking, stifle 
entrepreneurialism, and risk depressing wealth generation.100 
For purposes of this discussion, we will assume that life sciences 
companies’ off-label promotional behavior falls into two categories, both of 
which the board is aware — that which is misleading and untruthful, and 
that which, while also off-label, is supported by legitimate trials and/or peer 
reviewed articles. In either case, the government interprets the law as 
precluding off-label promotions.101 Presumably, few would defend false and 
misleading marketing. The question is whether directors violate the duty of 
loyalty, specifically their duty to act in good faith, by allowing or even 
encouraging profitable and truthful off-label promotional activities. 
The literature is unresolved on the question of whether intentional 
violations of the law constitute a violation of the duty of loyalty. Delaware 
case law would suggest that “fulfilling a fiduciary duty requires obedience to 
other positive law.”102 Commentators are in disagreement about this 
question. As assessed by Gold, “[p]ublic policy is a leading basis for limiting 
the board’s discretion to break the law. But viewing intentional violations of 
 
 93. Velasco, supra note 86, at 521. 
 94. See Disney, 907 A.2d at 751 (citing Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)). 
 95. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards 
of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 454 (1993). 
 96. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006). 
 97. Velasco, supra note 86, at 546. 
 98. Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
457, 466 (2009). 
 99. Id. at 526. 
 100. Velasco, supra note 86, at 550. 
 101. Joseph et al., supra note 14, at 7-8. 
 102. Disney, 907 A.2d at 697. 
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positive law as socially undesirable does not provide a clear conceptual 
basis for treating such violations as a form of disloyalty to the corporation or 
its shareholders.”103 
Even if we conclude that violating the law is prohibited by the duty of 
loyalty, shareholders derivative suits do not provide a mechanism for 
sanctioning directors who permit or encourage off-label marketing that 
results in fines if there is no net loss to the shareholders. We, here, imagine 
a board that employs a weak hand in dealing with off-label promotion and 
the use of incentives to sell products to health care providers. On the one 
hand, corporate compliance training educates the sales force regarding 
proper sales techniques. On the other, generous sales force compensation, 
including bonuses, depends upon the prescribing practices of the providers 
assigned to the sales representative, who also has an expense account to 
expend appropriately to advance company sales. The corporate ethos is one 
that promotes how important the company’s lifesaving drugs are to patients, 
how dependent physicians are upon sales representatives to remain current 
about the latest treatments, and how imperative it is that product adoption 
occurs before patent expiration and potentially lower quality (generic) 
products enter the market. 
The board makes no affirmative decision to encourage violations of the 
law. To the contrary, corporate policy forbids such behavior. Violations of 
the law occur in an ethos that emphasizes sales of products that are 
imperative to saving lives. Evidence of such an ethos, absent some decision 
by the board that approves of the illegal conduct at issue, is insufficient to 
establish the intent required to pursue a shareholder derivative action.104 
The ethos created by the board is one that benefits both the company and 
its shareholders. More product sales increase the value of the stock. 
Even if it were determined that the board acted illegally by implicitly 
encouraging or turning a blind eye to illegal promotional practices, thereby 
arguably violating the duty of loyalty, it is unlikely that damages can be 
proven. The directors will not have personally gained by their actions as they 
presumably have in self-dealing cases in which their gains are disgorged. 
Even with fines, the net revenues of blockbuster drugs, which likely result 
significantly from prohibited sales practices, result in a net benefit to the 
corporation.105 Whether stock prices are adversely affected by the significant 
fines levied by enforcement agencies requires analysis, but so many life 
science companies have been subject to CIAs that they may not cause 
adverse market reactions. Only if the sanctions from particular conduct were 
 
 103. Gold, supra note 98, at 475 (emphasis in original). 
 104. In re Johnson & Johnson Derivative Litig., Civil Action No. 10-2033, 2011 WL 
4526040, at *31-32 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2011). 
 105. Morris Testimony, supra note 12, at 6. 
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so high as to outweigh the increased profits would there be a problem, and 
we have seen that this is unlikely. 
Ultimately, the fact that shareholders are likely benefiting from the 
significant profits resulting from the complained of sales behavior, even with 
the significant fines being levied, suggests that a rational shareholder would 
desire this behavior to continue, and thereby lack any incentive to pursue 
the board for damages, which are speculative at best. 
Even if the outcome of a shareholder derivative suit were a finding of 
breach of fiduciary duty, an adverse outcome is unlikely to affect directors’ 
behavior because they are insured or indemnified against personal loss for 
the monetary damages attendant to an adverse outcome.106 That 
shareholder gain is unlikely is supported by the increasing frequency with 
which shareholder derivative cases are resolved with damages or monetary 
settlements; rather, the majority of settlements involve corporate reforms and 
significant attorneys’ fees.107 An October 2012 J&J settlement of a 
consolidated shareholder derivative action evidences this phenomenon.108 
The essential shareholder complaints alleged that the J&J board insulated 
itself from knowledge of compliance and quality issues among its many 
subsidiaries through its decentralized compliance structure, thereby enabling 
the board to ignore “red flags” involving product recalls, deviation from 
good manufacturing practices, off-label marketing, and illegal kick-backs. 
The case was settled with J&J agreeing to more centralized oversight of 
quality and compliance, with upstream reporting to the J&J board. Plaintiffs’ 
attorneys were awarded $10 million dollars in fees in addition to costs. 
There were fifteen objectors to the settlement, notable not for their 
number but for their arguments. All seemed to have wanted the suit 
dismissed in the first place, claiming that it was wasting resources in the 
form of attorneys’ fees. More relevant to this discussion, however, is one 
objector’s argument, with support from expert witnesses Professors Litvak 
and Henderson, that the plaintiffs’ experts failed to produce evidence that 
the recommended corporate reforms would produce any benefit for the 
corporation or shareholders in the form of increased value. 
 
 106. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). A potential law reform might be to amend 
Delaware or securities law to preclude indemnification of breach of loyalty claims related to 
legal violations. 
 107. See generally Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical 
Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749 (2010) (empirical study concluding that shareholders 
file more derivative suits than class actions; settlements usually involve corporate reforms 
rather than money; corporate reforms rarely benefit the corporations or their shareholders; the 
real winners are the plaintiffs’ attorneys who recover significant fees). 
 108. In re Johnson & Johnson Derivative Litig., Civil Action No. 10-2033, 2012 WL 
5292963 (D.N.J. Oct. 26, 2012) , available at http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/up 
loadedFiles/Reuters_Content/2012/10_-_October/jj.pdf. 
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If indeed it is true that the primary mover of these shareholder derivative 
cases are plaintiffs’ counsel, and the skepticism about the value of corporate 
governance reforms bears out, then a real question exists as to whether 
shareholder derivative suits have anything to contribute to corporate reform. 
As explained by Professor Gold, “[t]he Delaware courts have admittedly 
been wary about using fiduciary duties to enforce the norms of morality. This 
is cause to question whether the courts are truly concerned with what 
morality or virtue as such require of corporate directors.”109 By comparison, 
enforcement agencies, through their use of CIAs and DPAs, are seeking 
structural reforms that will result in a corporate ethos that strives toward the 
ethical conduct of business.110 
B. Purdue Pharma and the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine 
1. The Emergence of the Park Doctrine 
The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine’s genesis was the Supreme 
Court’s 1943 opinion in United States v. Dotterweich,111 in which the Court 
affirmed the misdemeanor conviction under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic 
Act of the president and general manager of a pharmaceutical company for 
the introduction of adulterated or misbranded products into commerce 
despite the defendant’s claim that he had no knowledge of the relabeling 
that gave rise to the conviction.112 The Court rejected the argument that the 
conviction of an individual not involved in the actual illegal conduct was too 
harsh, stating that “[t]he offense is committed . . . by all who do have such a 
responsible share in the furtherance of the transaction which the statute 
outlaws.”113 Though recognizing the hardship of penalizing someone not 
involved in illegal conduct, the Court responded that “[b]alancing relative 
hardships, Congress has preferred to place it upon those who have at least 
the opportunity of informing themselves of the existence of conditions 
imposed for the protection of consumers before sharing in illicit commerce, 
rather than to throw the hazard on the innocent public who are wholly 
helpless.”114 
U.S. v. Park required the Court to reconsider the Doctrine in 1975; the 
Court’s opinion revisited the same issue: the harshness of a criminal 
conviction of an individual lacking knowledge of the crime in the context of 
protecting public health.115 The facts of the case involved a shipment of 
 
 109. Gold, supra note 98, at 503 (emphasis in original). 
 110. O’Neil & Kennedy, supra note 41, at 308, 323, 349. 
 111. 320 U.S. 277 (1943). 
 112. Id. at 281, 285. 
 113. Id. at 284 (emphasis added). 
 114. Id. at 284-85. 
 115. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 660, 670-71 (1975). 
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food containing rodent contamination116 following multiple warnings from 
the FDA, about which the defendant, the CEO of a national food chain, was 
aware.117 Defendant Park argued that as CEO, matters such as food 
contamination and sanitation rested with others much below him in the 
corporate hierarchy, and that he had delegated the matter to a Vice 
President, after which there really was not much more he as president could 
do.118 On cross-examination, however, the defendant agreed there was 
clearly a problem in the company’s sanitation system, and that ultimately, it 
is the CEO who is responsible for systemic problems.119 The Court held that 
the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine is satisfied when the government 
introduces evidence that the individual defendant had “by reason of his 
position in the corporation, responsibility and authority either to prevent in 
the first instance, or promptly to correct, the violation complained of, and 
that he failed to do so.”120 
Insufficiently satisfying to the many detractors of the Doctrine, the Court 
addressed culpability by stating: “The considerations which prompted the 
imposition of this duty, and the scope of the duty, provide the measure of 
culpability.”121 The Court was clear that guilt is not based solely on the 
defendant’s corporate position, reiterating the Dotterweich quotation 
regarding a defendant’s relationship of responsibility as well as her authority 
to address the situation that gave rise to liability.122 Importantly, the Court 
explicitly recognized an affirmative defense when the defendant is 
“‘powerless’ to prevent or correct the violation.”123 
The Supreme Court upheld Park’s conviction, concluding that “the Act 
imposes the highest standard of care and permits conviction of responsible 
corporate officials who, in light of this standard of care, have the power to 
prevent or correct violations of its provisions.”124 The Court described the 
duty as one 
to implement measures that will insure that violations will not occur. The 
requirements of foresight and vigilance imposed on responsible corporate 
agents are beyond question demanding, and perhaps onerous, but they are 
no more stringent than the public has a right to expect of those who 
voluntarily assume positions of authority in business enterprises whose 
 
 116. Id. at 660-61. 
 117. Id. at 664. 
 118. Id. at 663-64. 
 119. Id. at 664-65. 
 120. Park, 421 U.S. at 673-74. 
 121. Id. at 674. 
 122. Id. at 672-73. 
 123. Id. at 673. 
 124. Id. at 676. 
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services and products affect the health and well-being of the public that 
supports them.125 
In short, in the case of a business that affects the public’s health, the 
Court places the burden and attendant risks of safety on corporate 
leadership to ensure that the highest standards of caution are taken. In the 
context of the Park facts, the Doctrine makes sense. Park knew there was a 
specific compliance problem with which the FDA was concerned;126 he knew 
that it was not adequately addressed the first time it arose;127 and he 
admitted that there was a systemic operational problem that he had not 
personally addressed.128 In the context of public health, it seems reasonable 
to hold Park ultimately responsible. 
2. Contemporary Application: Purdue Pharma 
I suggest that the case of the Purdue Parma senior executives who pled 
to misdemeanor violations under the Park Doctrine, resulting in their 
debarment from the Federal healthcare programs, was also an appropriate 
application of the Doctrine. Nonetheless, the case represents the most 
controversial use of the RCO Doctrine in the healthcare field in many years. 
Purdue Pharma is itself a unique entity in that it is family-owned129 and not 
publicly traded, which is rare in the pharmaceutical industry.130 Purdue 
Frederick, created in 1892,131 was acquired in 1952 by two psychiatrist 
brothers — Mortimer and Raymond Sackler — with the financial help of a 
third brother, Arthur, known as a brilliant scientist and psychiatrist whose 
financial success came from innovative pharmaceutical and medical 
advertising.132 In 1984, the brothers Sackler took an old drug used in 
 
 125. Park, 421 U.S. at 672. 
 126. Id. at 664. 
 127. Id. at 664-65. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See Bruce Weber, Mortimer D. Sackler, Arts Patron, Dies at 93, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 
2010, at A25. Of the trio of brothers who originally acquired Purdue Frederick in 1952, only 
one remains alive. Id. 
 130. Who We Are, About Purdue Pharma L.P., PURDUE PHARMA (2012), http://www.purdue 
pharma.com/about/. Many pharmaceutical entities are large, publicly traded companies. 
 131. Agreed Statement of Facts at 1, United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F. Supp. 
2d 569 (W.D. Va. 2007). 
 132. Grace Gleuck, Dr. Arthur Sackler Dies at 73; Philanthropist and Art Patron, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 27, 1987, at B8; Weber, supra note 129, at A25. According to Sackler’s 
biography in the Medical Advertising Hall of Fame, to which he was inducted in 1997, Sackler 
“helped shape pharmaceutical promotion as we know it today (he even experimented with 
medical radio and TV in the 1950’s), as well as established the role of communications and 
promotional programs in pharmaceutical marketing.” Inductees, Arthur M. Sackler, MED. 
ADVER. HALL OF FAME (2012), http://www.mahf.com/index.php?Itemid=139&id=117&option 
=com_content&task=view. 
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treating pain in cancer patients, repurposed it as MS Contin.133 The 
product’s success lead to the formation of Purdue Pharma as the vehicle for 
promoting its pain medications, of which OxyContin would prove to be 
among the most financially successful.134 
The FDA approved Purdue Pharma’s newly formulated OxyContin (the 
only controlled-release version of HCI oxycodone, an opiod agonist which 
has been on the market for many years with addiction potential similar to 
morphine)135 in 1995 to manage moderate to severe chronic pain when a 
continuous, potent narcotic is required around the clock;136 the package 
insert included a statement that “[d]elayed absorption, as provided by 
OxyContin tablets, is believed to reduce the abuse liability of a drug.”137 
Market research focus groups by Purdue with physicians in early 1995 
revealed that physicians’ biggest concern about OxyContin was its “abuse 
potential.”138 The focus group findings apparently resonated, because from 
the time of FDA approval until 2001, in some instances with their 
supervisors’ urging or through sales training, certain Purdue employees 
promoted OxyContin “as less addictive, less subject to abuse and diversion, 
and less likely to cause tolerance and withdrawal,” as subject to “fewer peak 
and trough blood level effects,” and producing less euphoria than other 
pain short-action opioids.139 Purdue representatives also told healthcare 
providers that patients could stop OxyContin abruptly with no adverse side 
effects, which was contradicted by Purdue’s own study.140 In 1997, Purdue 
 
 133. Katherine Eban, Painful Medicine, What the Strange Saga of Purdue Pharma – and its 
$3 Billion drug, OxyContin – Tell Us About Our National Dependence on Painkillers, FORTUNE, 
Sept. 21, 2011, at 143, 148, available at http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2011/11/ 
09/oxycontin-purdue-pharma/. 
 134. Id. at 144, 148. 
 135. Oxycontin: Balancing Risks and Benefits: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions, 107th Cong. 15 (2002) [hereinafter Jenkins Statement] 
(statement of John K. Jenkins, Director, Office of New Drugs, Center For Drug Evaluation and 
Research, Food and Drug Administration), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/ 
Testimony/ucm115180.htm. 
 136. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations for 2002, Part 10: OxyContin: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, 
Justice, State, and Judiciary of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 107th Cong. 15 (2001) 
[hereinafter Hutchinson Statement] (statement of Asa Hutchinson, Administrator, Drug 
Enforcement Administration). 
 137. Agreed Statement of Facts, supra note 131, at 5. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 5-6. According to Congressional testimony, “the disproportionate abuse of 
OxyContin is due, in part, to aggressive marketing and promotion of OxyContin by Purdue 
Pharma . . . accentuated the problem by suggesting that physicians prescribe OxyContin as a 
substitute for a variety of less addictive existing medications.” Hutchinson Statement, supra 
note 136, at 23. 
 140. Agreed Statement of Facts, supra note 131, at 5-6. 
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employees intentionally did nothing to disabuse physicians of their 
misperception that oxycodone was weaker than morphine.141 
The FDA sent Purdue Pharma a letter in May 2000 regarding a false 
and misleading advertisement in the New England Journal of Medicine142 
that implied OxyContin had been studied in all types of arthritis and can be 
used as first-line therapy for the treatment of osteoarthritis but failed to 
include important limitations to the study; it also promoted OxyContin in a 
selected class of patients without including the attendant risks.143 Purdue 
Pharma and the FDA agreed upon label changes in 2001 to include a 
“black box” warning of the potentially lethal consequences of using 
OxyContin other than as directed, as well as an instruction sheet for 
patients.144 OxyContin became the most prescribed Schedule II narcotic in 
the United States, with 5.8 million prescriptions in 2000.145 Its revenues 
reached approximately $3 billion in June 2001, accounting for 80% of 
Purdue Pharma’s revenue.146 Effective August 5, 2010,147 Purdue 
discontinued manufacturing and distribution of the original formulation, 
replacing it with an FDA-approved reformulation that is much more difficult 
for abusers to penetrate by cutting, breaking, crushing, or dissolving.148 
OxyContin sales reached $3.5 billion in 2010.149 
 
 141. Id. at 9-10. 
 142. Letter from Spencer Salis, Regulatory Review Officer, Div. of Drug Mktg., Adver. & 
Commc’ns, Food & Drug Admin., to Beth Connelly, Senior Assoc., Regulatory Affairs, Purdue 
Pharma, L.P. (May 11, 2000) available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidance 
ComplianceRegulatoryInformation/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofVio
lationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompanies/UCM166015.pdf. Apparently, the “advertisement” 
was actually an article published on March 27, 2000 that was authored by Purdue employees; 
the reprints were then provided to sales representatives for use in marketing to physicians. 
News Release, John L. Brownlee & Heidi Coy, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Va., 
The Purdue Frederick Company, Inc. and Top Executives Plead Guilty to Misbranding 
OxyContin; Will Pay Over $600 Million (May 10, 2007), available at http://www.tricare.mil/ 
fraud/News/Document/purdue_freder.pdf. 
 143. Jenkins Statement, supra note 135, at 18. 
 144. Id. at 16. 
 145. Hutchinson Statement, supra note 136. 
 146. Weber, supra note 129, at A25. 
 147. Purdue’s Prescription Drug Products, PURDUE PHARMA (2012), http://www.purdue 
pharma.com/Products/Prescription/Pages/default.aspx. 
 148. News Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves New Formulation for 
OxyContin (Apr. 5, 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAn 
nouncements/ucm207480.htm. However, Purdue Pharma’s discussion of the newly 
reformulated pain medication emphasizes that “there is no evidence that the reformulation of 
OxyContin is less subject to misuse, abuse, diversion, overdose or addiction.” Statement of 
Purdue Pharma, L.P. Regarding FDA’s Approval of Reformulated OxyContin (oxycodone HCI 
controlled-release) Tablets, PURDUE PHARMA (April 5, 2010), available at http://www.purdue 
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OxyContin is “a very effective and efficient analgesic.”150 In addition to 
its legitimate use, however, OxyContin became very popular as a street 
drug, either taken orally, injected, or crushed, which circumvented the 
controlled release mechanism and allowed a more rapid and intense 
heroin-like high.151 Diversion to street use became acute in rural areas such 
as Appalachia before spreading to urban areas.152 Emergency room visits 
related to ingestion of products containing oxycondone increased 89% from 
1993 to 1999 and then again by 68% between 1999 and 2000.153 While 
reports of addiction by people using OxyContin as prescribed were rare, 
many people with legitimate prescriptions became addicted by self-
medicating.154 
In 2007, the U.S. Attorney in the Western District of Virginia charged the 
company and three top executives with violations of the Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act.155 The Purdue Frederick Company, Inc., along with the 
President, Chief Legal Officer, and former Chief Medical Officer of Purdue 
Pharma LP, entered into a global settlement whereby they pled guilty to 
felony charges of fraudulent misbranding of OxyContin, agreeing to pay 
fines totaling $634,515,475.156 Notably, Purdue Pharma was not charged, 
thereby enabling it to continue to submit drug applications to the FDA and 
allowing it to continue its relationship with Federal healthcare programs, 




 149. Oxycontin, DRUG PATENT WATCH (2012), http://drugpatentwatch.com/ultimate/pre 
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 151. Hutchinson Statement, supra note 136. 
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 153. Hanson Statement, supra note 150, at 3. 
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 155. Agreed Statement of Facts, supra note 131, at 1-2, 14-15. 
 156. Brownlee & Coy, supra note 142, at 1. Purdue Frederick pleaded to a felony, while 
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Medicaid.157 Three top executives — President and CEO Michael Friedman, 
Vice President and Chief Legal Officer Howard Udell,158 and Vice President 
and Chief Scientific Officer Paul Goldenheim — simultaneously pled guilty 
to the misdemeanor violation of introduction into commerce of a 
misbranded drug,159 pursuant to the RCO Doctrine which imposed upon the 
defendants the “responsibility and authority either to prevent in the first 
instance or to promptly correct certain conduct resulting in the misbranding 
. . . .”160 
Attendant to their guilty pleas, the individual defendants assented to an 
Agreed Statement of Facts, which states that the “company supervisors . . . 
repeatedly misrepresented the drug’s addictiveness and potential for abuse 
and diversion in an effort to ‘defraud or mislead’ the medical 
community.”161 It explicitly states that the defendants had no personal 
knowledge of “all of the matters” set forth in the Agreed Statement of 
Facts,162 and that they were “responsible corporate officers” of Purdue.163 In 
addition to fines164 designed to significantly disgorge the compensation 
earned during the misbranding period,165 but that were actually paid for by 
 
 157. Kathleen M. Boozang, A New Insurance Product: Responsible Corporate Officer 
Defense Insurance, HEALTH REFORM WATCH (March 8, 2012), http://www.healthreformwatch. 
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 159. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2006). 
 160. Agreed Statement of Facts, supra note 131, at 3. 
 161. Friedman v. Sebelius, 755 F. Supp. 2d 98, 102 (D.D.C 2010). The [Inspector 
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Purdue pursuant to indemnification agreements,166 the executives were each 
sentenced to three years’ probation and 400 hours of community service.167 
In March 2008, Purdue Pharma’s corporate officials were notified by the 
Inspector General of Health and Human Services that, as a result of their 
convictions, they were excluded from all Federal healthcare programs, 
including Medicare and Medicaid for twenty (later reduced by the 
Departmental Appeals Board to twelve) years,168 under the Secretary’s 
authority for permissive exclusions for having been convicted “of a criminal 
offense consisting of a misdemeanor relating to fraud . . . .”169 The 
exclusion was upheld by the administrative law judge,170 Departmental 
Appeals Board,171 and the District of Columbia federal district court.172 The 
OIG based the exclusion on three factors:  (1) the conduct upon which the 
convictions were based lasted more than a year; (2) “the amount of 
financial loss; and (3) the significant adverse physical or mental impact 
upon program beneficiaries.”173 The executives’ appeal to the Court of 
Appeals argued that the statute does not authorize their exclusion, and that 
the exclusion was unsupported by substantial evidence and was arbitrary 
and capricious because it lacked a reasoned explanation of the exclusions’ 
length.174 The executives were unsuccessful before the appellate court with 
respect to the fact of their exclusion, but prevailed on the arguments related 
to the length of exclusion, causing the case to be remanded to the Secretary 
of HHS.175 
The Pharma executives argued that they could not be excluded for 
misdemeanor misbranding under the RCO Doctrine because the convictions 
were strict liability offenses which did not require any evidence of personal 
wrong-doing or scienter.176 They unsuccessfully argued that they personally 
 
 166. Friedman, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 102 n.7. 
 167. Id. at 102. 
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would have had to engage in the fraud or other activity that subjects one to 
exclusion.177 The government prevailed against this argument on the basis 
of the statutory language, which allows exclusion of those convicted of 
misdemeanors “related to fraud;” there need only have been a factual 
connection between the criminal conduct and fraud in a government 
program — there need be no evidence that the defendant himself engaged 
in fraud.178 
The appellants were more successful in challenging the length of their 
exclusions; twelve years is four times the statutory baseline of a three-year 
exclusion absent aggravating or mitigating factors.179 The appellants’ 
suggestion of mitigating factors gained no traction with the court — that the 
government had no proof of harm exceeding $5,000 to its health 
programs; the executives were convicted on the basis of omissions rather 
than specific acts, and that they lacked any awareness of wrong-doing.180 
The single issue on which the Pharma executives were successful on appeal 
was that the length of the exclusions was arbitrary and capricious because 
the decision was unaccompanied by an explanation of why the exclusion 
exceeded by eight years any previously imposed sanction under the 
permissive exclusion section of the law.181 
3. A Contemporary Application: Synthes 
The Synthes’ executives’ behavior and consequences were of a whole 
different degree than those in Purdue Pharma. Synthes is a multinational 
medical device manufacturer of which Norian was a subsidiary acquired in 
1999.182 Norian produced two FDA-approved bone cements that it desired 
to market for spinal infusions, despite labeling that its product could not be 
used for spinal indications and was “non-load bearing only.”183 Because the 
FDA did not require other cement manufactures to include this caveat, 
Synthes executives believed they were at a competitive disadvantage.184 The 
FDA was explicit in advising Synthes that spinal use of its products would 
require clinical trials and pre-market approval.185 
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02, 2010 WL 4977512 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/ 
pae/Pharma-Device/synthes_supersedinginformation.pdf. 
 183. Id. at 1, 12, 17. 
 184. Id. at 23. 
 185. Id. at 14-15. 
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Even while receiving reports from surgeons about patients suffering 
hypotensive episodes186 believed to be attributable to an adverse interaction 
of the Norian cement with patients’ blood following cement leaks, Synthes 
elected to circumvent the formal clinical trial process and notification to the 
FDA.187 Instead, it initiated “test market” activities with an eye towards 
collecting data from multiple surgeons about spinal use of its product, 
producing a peer-reviewed article, and then marketing off-label.188 To this 
end, Synthes trained two groups of surgeons in the use of its product for 
spinal surgery, who were to then train other surgeons, as part of the “test 
market” project.189 Three patients died of hypotensive events while in surgery 
— Synthes’ sales representatives were present in the surgical suite at the 
time of each death but clinical analysis has not occurred to determine 
whether Norian cement caused the deaths.190 
The Synthes executives who ultimately plead guilty pursuant to the RCO 
Doctrine, who included the Synthes North American President, President of 
Synthes Spine Division, Senior Vice President of Operations, and the 
Director of Regulatory and Clinical Affairs,191 received multiple warnings 
from surgical consultants,192 employees,193 and the FDA that proceeding 
with the off-label testing, use, and marketing of its product was illegal and 
 
 186. A hypotensive episode is defined as a sudden unexpected drop in blood pressure. 
Low Blood Pressure (Hypotension), MAYO CLINIC (May 19, 2011), http://www.mayoclinic. 
com/health/low-blood-pressure/DS00590. 
 187. Id. at 13, 15. One of Synthes’ competitors obtained FDA permission to conduct a 
trial, and a Synthes employee prepared a proposal for Synthes to do the same, which Synthes 
executives ignored. Id. at 22. 
 188. Superseding Information, supra note 182, at 15, 20. 
 189. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, International Medical Device Maker Agrees to 
Plead Guilty in Connection with Shipments of Adulterated and Misbranded Bone Cement 
Prods. as Part of Unlawful Clinical Trials 3 (Oct. 4, 2010), available at http://www.justice. 
gov/usao/pae/News/2010/Oct/synthes,norian_release.pdf. 
 190. Superseding Information, supra note 182, at 19, 21, 23. 
 191. David Sell, “Human Experimentation” Leads to Sentencing for Ex-Synthes Executives, 
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Nov. 21, 2011, http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/phillypharma/134 
229168.html. 
 192. Indictment at 13, United States v. Synthes Inc., Criminal No. 09-403-02, 2010 WL 
4977512 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/News/ 
2009/jun/synthesind.pdf (discussing notification of two adverse events during off label use); 
id. at 14 (noting that spine trauma surgeon suggests cement might be interacting with blood 
and causing problems); id. at 16 (stating that surgeon also suggested clinical studies were 
needed); id. at 21-22 (noting another surgeon hypothesized that the dewatering was causing 
hypotension, that company was violating warning on label, and that the company had risk 
management and compliance problems). 
 193. Id. at 12 (warning that Norian cannot promote cement for unapproved uses); id. at 
13 (noting that another company had received an FDA warning letter about claims for spinal 
use of cement); id. at 18-19 (stating training surgeons on off-label uses would be illegal). 
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unethical.194 Not only did Synthes fail to recall its bone cement from the 
market until after the third patient death, it also made false statements to an 
FDA official during a 2004 inspection.195 
Synthes pled guilty to a misdemeanor violation of the FDCA of 
introducing misbranded and adulterated medical devices into interstate 
commerce;196 Norian pled guilty to a felony;197 and the individual 
defendants pled guilty to misdemeanor charges of shipping adulterated and 
misbranded products in interstate commerce pursuant to the RCO 
Doctrine.198 Synthes entered into an extremely onerous CIA with OIG.199 The 
OIG agreed to waive permissive exclusion of Synthes from the Federal 
healthcare program on condition that it divested all of Norian’s assets to an 
entity wholly unaffiliated with Synthes.200 Norian was sold to Kensey Nash 
Corp.,201 and Johnson & Johnson acquired Synthes in a $21.3 billion 
transaction.202 The individual defendants served prison sentences ranging 
from five to nine months, and were fined $100,000 each, the maximum 
amounts allowed.203 
 
 194. See Letter from Timothy A. Ulatowski, Director, Office of Compliance, Food & Drug 
Admin., to Maria L. Maccecchini, President, Synthes Biomaterials Worldwide Division, Synthes, 
Inc. (Nov. 5, 2004), available at http://www.circare.org/fdawls2/synthes_20041105.pdf. 
 195. Press Release, supra note 189, at 2. 
 196. Settlement Agreement at 2, United States v. Synthes Inc., Criminal No. 09-403-02, 
2010 WL 4977512 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/ 
Pharma-Device/synthesnorian_settlementagreement.pdf. The companies explicitly denied the 
allegations of wrongdoing contained in the Settlement Agreement. Id. at 3. 
 197. Id. at 2. 
 198. Peter Loftus, Ex-Synthes Executive Huggins Gets 9 Months in Jail, WALL ST. J. MARKET 
WATCH, Nov. 21, 2011, http://www.marketwatch.com/Story/story/print?guid=12B5B2FD-99 
93-4691-A0C2-9929F16B287C. 
 199. Corporate Integrity Agreement, United States v. Synthes Inc., Criminal No. 09-403-
02, 2010 WL 4977512 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2010), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/ 
agreements/synthes_inc_09232010.pdf. 
 200. Divestiture Agreement at 2, United States v. Synthes Inc., Criminal No. 09-403-02, 
2010 WL 4977512 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/ 
Pharma-Device/synthes_divestagrmt.pdf. 
 201. Loftus, supra note 198. 
 202. Johnson & Johnson and Synthes Announce Definitive Merger Agreement to Create 
World’s Most Innovative and Comprehensive Orthopaedics Business, JOHNSON & JOHNSON 
(Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.jnj.com/connect/news/all/johnson-and-johnson-synthes-medical-
device. 
 203. 18 U.S.C. § 1371(b)(5) (2006) (fines for individuals found guilty of a Class A 
misdemeanor may not be exceed $100,000); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former 
Executives of International Medical Device Maker Sentenced to Prison in Unlawful Clinical 
Trials Case 1, 2 (Nov. 21, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/News/2011/ 
Nov/synthesexecs_release.pdf. 
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If the facts recounted in the government’s Information accurately reflect 
the involvement of Synthes corporate executives in its patient trials, they were 
personally and deeply involved in the companies’ transgressions, thereby 
eliminating the complaint about the RCO Doctrine that executives unaware 
of corporate illegalities should not be subject to criminal penalties. 
While the known facts of Purdue Pharma do not directly and personally 
implicate the corporate officers, they do represent a scenario for which 
application of the RCO Doctrine is appropriate. What the corporate 
executives knew, if anything, is beside the point for purposes of the RCO 
Doctrine. The point is that they managed companies where employees were 
engaged in clearly illegal behavior — misrepresenting the attributes of 
products to physicians — that presented extreme risk to the public. The 
occurrence of this behavior suggests management failures directly 
attributable to leadership. While no one would expect a corporation’s 
officers to know or control everything that happens within its operations, the 
activities in both of these instances were sufficiently significant that the 
consequences, if not the actual behaviors, should have been detected by 
managerial oversight and/or corporate compliance efforts. That employees, 
including those at the highest levels of the corporation in the case of 
Synthes, participated in the illegal conduct implicates the corporate ethos 
and suggests either that the toleration level for unethical and risky behavior 
was extremely permissive, or that the focus on sales at all costs was so 
extreme that it trumped all other principles and values throughout the 
company. The problems of Purdue Pharma and Synthes were ultimately 
about leadership and responsibility, which is what the Park Doctrine 
addresses. 
4. FDA Announces Criteria for Park Doctrine Prosecutions 
On the heels of this success, the FDA announced that it was 
implementing a Government Accountability Office (GAO) suggestion that it 
increase its use of misdemeanor prosecutions against responsible corporate 
officials.204 The agency released its internal agency guidance for 
determining when to forward a case to the DOJ for a “Park Doctrine 
Prosecution.”205 The guidance provides that a first time conviction for a 
violation of the FDCA will be a misdemeanor, with the second resulting in a 
 
 204. Letter from Margaret A. Hamburg, Comm’r of Food & Drugs, Food & Drug Admin., 
to Senator Charles E. Grassley, Senate Comm. on Fin. (Mar. 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.grassley.senate.gov/about/upload/FDA-3-4-10-Hamburg-letter-to-Grassley-re-
GAO-report-on-OCI.pdf. 
 205. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REGULATORY PROCEDURES 
MANUAL 6-49 (2011) [hereinafter FDA REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL], available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/RegulatoryProceduresManual/default.htm. 
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felony.206 Further, in some cases, a misdemeanor conviction can result in 
debarment by the FDA.207 The guidance enumerates the following criteria: 
 The individual’s position in the company; relationship to the 
violation; whether the official had the authority to correct or prevent 
the violation 
 Knowledge of and actual participation in the violation 
 Actual or potential harm to the public 
 Obviousness of the violation 
 Existence of a pattern of illegal behavior and/or failure to heed prior 
warnings 
 Whether the violation is widespread 
 Seriousness of the violation 
 Quality of the legal and factual support for the proposed prosecution 
 Whether prosecution is a prudent use of agency resources208 
Within the same week, Lewis Morris, then-Chief Counsel to the Inspector 
General of Health & Human Services, testified before the House Ways and 
Means Committee that the OIG would consider any individual convicted 
pursuant to the RCO Doctrine for exclusion from participation in Federal 
healthcare programs.209 This, Mr. Morris testified, will overcome the barriers 
presented by corporations’ attitude that they are too important to the 
healthcare system to criminally prosecute and that fines are simply a cost of 
doing business.210 Mr. Morris assured the House Committee that the OIG 
would use this tool judiciously, employing a presumption in favor of 
exclusion only “when there is evidence that an executive knew or should 
have known of the underlying criminal misconduct of the organization.”211 
 
 206. Id. 
 207. 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1) (2006); FDA REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 
205, at 6-49. 
 208. FDA REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 205, at 6-49. 
 209. Morris Testimony, supra note 12, at 6. Section 1128(b)(15)(A)(ii) of the Social Security 
Act authorizes “permissive exclusions” by the OIG in situations of health care fraud that does 
not involve Medicare or Medicaid, and that which involves the unlawful manufacture, 
distribution, prescription or dispensing of controlled substances; submission of false or 
fraudulent claims to a Federal healthcare program; and engaging in unlawful kickback 
arrangements. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b) (2006). The individuals subject to this permissive 
exclusion authority include an individual owner, “officer, director, agent, or managing 
employee” of a sanctioned entity if he knew or should have known of the conduct underlying 
the sanctioned entity’s violation, as well as an “officer or managing employee” of a 
sanctioned entity. Id. § 1320a–7(b)(8), (15). See also Levinson, supra note 44, at 5 (stating 
that the “OIG is focused on holding Responsible Corporate Officials accountable for 
healthcare fraud”). 
 210. Morris Testimony, supra note 12, at 6. 
 211. Id. 
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The OIG’s published (non-exclusive) criteria for permissive exclusions212 
from Federal healthcare programs includes a consideration of the entity’s 
misconduct, including whether it is part of a pattern of conduct and whether 
it caused harm to beneficiaries; the individual’s role in the sanctioned entity 
with a focus on degree of managerial control or authority and the position’s 
relation to the underlying misconduct and whether the misconduct occurred 
in the individual’s chain of command; and finally, detailed information 
about the nature of the sanctioned entity including its size, revenues, 
organization and structure.213 It seems that the criteria focus on corporate 
ethos and organization as it relates to the ability of top management to have 
access to information about the ethos of the corporation, and the tone of 
compliance that pervades the organization. 
C. When the Application of the Park Doctrine Makes Sense 
Unquestionably, more facts about NECC are required prior to 
determining who might be considered appropriate targets for conviction 
under the RCO Doctrine. The case epitomizes the situation contemplated by 
the Supreme Court, however, when it referred to imposing responsibility 
upon those best able to avoid harms to innocent consumers. We can only 
wait to see what prosecutorial decisions the government makes.214 
Questions abound about the application of the RCO Doctrine — a few 
of which are addressed here. The first question addresses the actual scope 
of the Doctrine, which should extend to both officers and directors. The 
situations in which criminal responsibility for corporate misbehavior should 
adhere to individuals implicate fiduciary responsibility.215 Because these 
duties do not depend upon one’s status as a director or officer,216 the 
Doctrine should encompass both, although any particular circumstance may 
 
 212. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR 
IMPLEMENTING PERMISSIVE EXCLUSION AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 1128(B)(15) OF THE SOCIAL 
SECURITY ACT (2010), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/exclusions/files/permissive_excl_ 
under_1128b15_10192010.pdf. 
 213. Id. at 3-4. 
 214. The Responsible Corporate Office Doctrine has never, to my pervasive knowledge 
been applied to executives of a compounder, which is not subject to pervaswive FDA 
jurisdiction. However, section 351(a)(2)(B), which relates to products determined to be 
adulterated due to the failure to adhere to good manufacturing practices, applies to a 
compounded drug that fails to meet the criteria of section 353(a), which would thereby seem 
to encompass NECC. 
 215. Amy J. Sepinwall, Guilty by Proxy: Expanding the Boundaries of Responsibility in the 
Face of Corporate Crime, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 411, 439-40 (2012). 
 216. See, e.g., Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708-09 (Del. 2009); see, e.g., 
Friedman v. Sebelius, No. 11-5028, 2012 WL 3055520 at *1 (D.C. 2012); see also 
Sepinwall, supra note 215, at 417 n.26 (stating officers and directors owe the corporation the 
same fiduciary duties). 
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not justify punishing directors as well as officers. Corporate officers and 
directors must own the culture of their organizations. Every conversation 
about corporate ethics and compliance rests on the foundation principle 
that the “tone is set at the top.”217 This should translate into a system that 
incentivizes, rewards, and sanctions those at the top, who are the entity’s 
directors. As suggested earlier, corporate law jurisprudence does not aspire 
to encourage corporate morality.218 Neither is it particularly effective at 
addressing corporate illegalities if those legal breaches are highly profitable. 
The law of fiduciary duties wishes to give breadth for risk-taking, which 
results in over-breadth, as it can also protect law breaking. Enforcement 
agencies charged in particular with protecting public health and safety 
require another tool in their armament. The ability to impose the RCO 
Doctrine on both officers and directors could prove to be such a tool. 
The RCO Doctrine should be used sparingly. Dotterweich, Park, Purdue 
Pharma and Synthes were egregious situations that epitomize the 
appropriate application of the Park Doctrine. It should be employed against 
responsible executives and/or directors of New England Compounding. 
Enforcement agencies seek structural reform of corrupt organizations. When 
it is the culture, as opposed to the more frequent situation where it is an 
individual or a segment of the organization, that is corrupt, the responsibility 
for this failure must lie at the feet of the organization’s corporate leadership, 
and there should be tools for accountability. The determination of whether 
an organization is truly corrupt should be hard and complex, with a 
consideration of how long current leadership has been at the helm, the 
complexity and size of the organization, whether an effective corporate 
compliance program exists, the pervasiveness of illegal conduct throughout 
the organization such that it can be said to be encouraged or approved, the 
values and incentives used in hiring and rewarding those who exercise 
discretionary authority throughout the organization. 
This justification of the RCO Doctrine is not dissimilar to the rationale 
presented by Professor Sepinwall for corporate criminal liability, with the 
twist that while the liability would be that of the corporation, she wishes to 
see individual corporate officers singled out for punishment as surrogates of 
a sort for the corporate entity.219 As conceived by Sepinwall, “when the 
corporation commits a crime, its senior officers and directors are necessarily 
blameworthy, whether or not they participated in the crime, recklessly 
tolerated it, or negligently allowed it to occur.”220 Specifically, she believes, 
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 218. See supra Part II.A. 
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 220. Id. at 415 (emphasis in original). 
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as do I, that there are cases of corporate criminal liability where the 
corporate officials are morally responsible for the crime,221 and should be 
held to some account. This position is not intended to suggest that the 
corporation is not also a moral agent with responsibility.222 In the situation 
that frames this article, however, that is neither here nor there, as we have 
already concluded that we seek to avoid the great harms that would result 
from corporate prosecution. 
The most significant objection to the RCO Doctrine is that it requires no 
evidence of knowledge of wrongdoing by the corporate officer.223 The 
absence of the specific knowledge requirement goes to the heart of the 
goals being pursued in seeking a reform of ethos or norms. Rogue behavior 
by an isolated individual is much more credible in entities with a zero 
tolerance policy with respect to certain kinds of behavior. If such a corporate 
climate exists, rogue behavior by a single individual or a particular unit of a 
company is more likely to be reported or discovered and dealt with. If 
instead the problem is that the performance expectations to which 
employees are held require violations of the law to be met, the problem is 
actually one of ethos set by management and the board, not the rogue 
employee who is morally incapable of following the rules.224 And this is the 
ultimate point of the RCO doctrine — it is about creating a corporate 
atmosphere about expectations, and clear consequences when such 
expectations are not met.225 Creating this ethos is the responsibility of the 
board in the first instance, to be executed by the corporation’s officers. The 
operating assumption accepts that it is impossible for corporate leadership 
to know everything that occurs ostensibly in the corporation’s name or on its 
behalf. However, leadership can also insulate itself from knowledge — 
giving themselves “plausible deniability” — which is an option that should 
not be available.226 
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